|As of 10/21/14||NAV||$ Change|
|Global Value Fund||26.47||+0.35|
|Global Value Fund II||14.20||+0.17|
|To view a Fund's historical performance, click on the Fund name above.|
In accordance with rules and guidelines set out by the United States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission, we have provided a comparison of the historical investment results of Tweedy, Browne Value Fund to the results of the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index (the S&P 500), the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index (Hedged to US$) and the S&P 500/MSCI World Index (Hedged to US$). For the period from the Fund's inception through 2006, the Investment Adviser chose the S&P 500 as the relevant market benchmark. Starting in mid-December 2006, the Fund's investment mandate changed from investing at least 80% of its assets in US securities to investing in no less than approximately 50% in US securities, and so the Investment Adviser chose the MSCI World Index (Hedged to US$) as the most relevant benchmark for the Fund for periods starting January 1, 2007. The S&P 500 is an index composed of 500 widely held common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and over-the-counter market. The MSCI World Index (Hedged to US$) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets. The S&P 500/MSCI World Index (Hedged to US$) is a combination of the S&P 500 Index and the MSCI World Index (Hedged to US$), linked together by Tweedy, Browne Company, and represents the performance of the S&P 500 Index for the periods 12/8/93 — 12/31/06, and the performance of the MSCI, World Index (Hedged to US$), beginning 1/1/07 and thereafter. Although we believe this comparison may be useful, the historical results of the S&P 500 and the MSCI World Index in large measure represent the investment results of stocks that we do not own. Any portfolio that does not own exactly the same stocks in exactly the same proportions as the index to which the particular portfolio is being compared is not likely to have the same results as the index. The investment behavior of a diversified portfolio of undervalued stocks tends to be correlated to the investment behavior of a broad index; i.e., when the index is up, probably more than one-half of the stocks in the entire universe of public companies that are included in the same index will be up, albeit in greater or lesser percentages than the index. Similarly, when the index declines, probably more than one half of the stocks in the entire universe of public companies that are included in the index will be down in greater or lesser percentages than the index. But it is almost a mathematical truth that "different stocks equal different results."
We believe that favorable or unfavorable historical investment results in comparison to an index are not necessarily predictive of future comparative investment results. In 1986, V. Eugene Shahan, a Columbia University Business School alumnus and portfolio manager at U.S. Trust, wrote Are Short-Term Performance and Value Investing Mutually Exclusive? In this article, Mr. Shahan analyzed the investment performance of seven money managers, about whom Warren Buffett wrote in his article, The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville. Over long periods of time, the seven managers significantly outperformed the market as measured by the Dow Jones Industrial Average (the DJIA) or the S&P 500 by between 7.7% and 16.5% annually. (The goal of most institutional money managers is to outperform the market by 2% to 3%.) However, for periods ranging from 13 years to 28 years, this group of managers underperformed the market between 7.7% and 42% of the years. Six of the seven investment managers underperformed the market between 28% and 42% of the years. In today's environment, they would have lost many of their clients during their periods of underperformance. Longer term, it would have been the wrong decision to fire any of those money managers. In examining the seven long-term investment records, unfavorable investment results as compared to either index did not predict the future favorable comparative investment results that occurred, and favorable investment results in comparison to the DJIA or the S&P 500 were not always followed by future favorable comparative results. Stretches of consecutive annual underperformance ranged from one to six years. Mr. Shahan concluded: Unfortunately, there is no way to distinguish between a poor three-year stretch for a manager who will do well over 15 years, from a poor three-year stretch for a manager who will continue to do poorly. Nor is there any reason to believe that a manager who does well from the outset cannot continue to do well, and consistently.